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Article Dans Une Revue American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Année : 2020

Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs *

Résumé

The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities and beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case of belief heterogeneity, the standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such a separate aggregation, a new condition, called the belief-proof Pareto condition, is proposed to alleviate occurrences of spurious agreement by restricting unanimity to beliefs that can be considered reasonable by society. Then, we show, in the Anscombe-Aumann (Theorems 1) and the Savage (Theorems 2) framework, that the belief-proof Pareto condition is equivalent to separate aggregation of individual beliefs and tastes.
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Dates et versions

hal-03034701 , version 1 (17-09-2021)

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Antoine Billot, Xiangyu Qu. Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs *. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2020, 13 (3), pp.112-123. ⟨10.1257/mic.20180344⟩. ⟨hal-03034701⟩
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